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Abstract
We study public good provision in a two-country dynamic setup with
environmental externalities. In this framework, we examine robust decision
making under potential misspecication of the process that describes the
evolution of the environmental public good. Robust policies, arising from fear
of model misspecication, help to correct for the ine¢ ciencies associated with
free riding and thus increase the provision of the public good. As a result,
there can be welfare gains from robust policies even when the fear of model
misspecication proves to be unfounded.
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1
1 Introduction
Public goods are under-provided in the absence of coordination. This arises
because of the incentive to free ride. In this paper, we revisit this classic issue
in a dynamic context where there is uncertainty about the correct model
specication regarding the public good. Environmental quality exemplies
this kind of public good, since the true model that generates environmental
damage is poorly known. Examples of such environmental public goods (and
their converse) include pollution, climate change, biodiversity, prevention and
containment of disease outbreaks, and the production of scientic knowledge
with respect to green technologies (see e.g. the discussion in Barrett (2008),
Bramoullé and Treich (2009), Boucher and Bramoullé (2010) and Vardas and
Xepapadeas (2010)).
There is a signicant literature that examines individual voluntary con-
tributions to the provision of a public good in a setting with uncertainty (see
e.g. Cornes and Sandler (1996, ch. 6) for an exposition and Keenan et al.
(2006) for a more recent contribution). Depending on properties of the utility
function, the literature shows that a mean-preserving increase in the variance
of the contribution by others to the public good can increase voluntary con-
tributions and hence equilibrium public good provision. This result nds
a parallel in work on dynamic models exhibiting precautionary behaviour,
where the latter takes the form of increased asset accumulation, an outcome
that typically requires a convex marginal utility function (see e.g. Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2012, ch. 18)). The ndings on increased public good provision
under uncertainty naturally extend to the provision of international envi-
ronmental public goods. For instance, in a static model with uncertainty
about environmental damage and strategic interactions, Bramoullé and Tre-
ich (2009) show that higher uncertainty, in the form of increased variance
in the stochastic processes that a¤ect the quantity of the public good, can
decrease emissions.1 However, in this literature, it is assumed that agents
know the model and uncertainty typically takes the form of random draws
from known exogenous processes.
We contribute to this literature by focusing instead on model uncertainty.
Under model uncertainty, the decision maker worries about potential model
misspecication that is endogenous and may feed back on the state of the
system, implying that shocks assigned to model uncertainty might arise as an
1The literature has also studied di¤erent forms of uncertainty and mechanisms for
alleviating the free-riding problem in environmental public good provision (see e.g. Na
and Shin (1998), Boucher and Bramoullé (2010) and Finus and Pintassilgo (2012) for the
e¤ect of uncertainty on international environmental agreements and Bogmans (2015) and
Markusen (2014) for terms-of-trade incentives). See below for further details.
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unknown function of the actions of the decision maker. Model uncertainty is
a more general form of uncertainty and, we believe, a more appropriate one
in the context of environmental public goods, where uncertainty typically
relates to lack of knowledge about the true environmental mechanism and
where disturbances to the environmental process are believed to be related
to human activity in ways that are not fully known. Moreover, given that
both the environmental process and the impact of economic activity on it
are dynamic, we formally study their dynamic interaction.
To examine decision making under model uncertainty, we follow the liter-
ature on robust decision-making that provides a formalisation of a conserva-
tive or precautionary approach to choices under model uncertainty. A robust
decision maker makes choices assuming that the unknown processes of the
model, capturing potential misspecication, follow an appropriately dened
worst-case scenario. This is achieved formally by focusing on the implemen-
tation of a max-min method (see e.g. Hansen and Sargent (2008)), resulting
in a general recommendation to adopt precautionary policies that ensure a
minimum level of welfare.2
In this paper, building on the above two literatures, we analyse the im-
plications of robust decision-making for the provision of a public good in
the absence of a coordination mechanism. In line with the examples in the
opening paragraph, we work with a model in which the public good is the
environment. In particular, we use a dynamic two-country model where en-
vironmental quality in one country a¤ects the welfare of the other country.
Cross-border externalities of this type lead to the standard incentive to free
ride on one anothers contribution to the public good, where free-riding takes
the form of over-production and over-pollution. To this well-recognised setup,
we add model uncertainty in the form of uncertainty about the evolution of
environmental quality. We solve for a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium in
which robust policymakers in one country do not internalise the e¤ects of
their economic and environmental policies on the welfare of the other coun-
try.
Our results show that, under model uncertainty, robust policies increase
the provision of the public good. In other words, robust decision-making
works as a substitute for cooperation. In particular, fear of model misspec-
ication about the process driving the environmental public good creates
a precautionary incentive that decreases the depletion of the environmen-
tal good and works in the opposite direction from the standard incentive to
2See e.g. the applications in Hansen and Sargent (2008 and 2010), Dennis (2010),
Athanassoglou and Xepapadeas (2012) and Svec (2012) for examples of precautionary
behaviour resulting from robust decision making in asset pricing, as well as in monetary,
scal and environmental policy.
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free ride on the contribution of others. Precautionary behaviour in general,
and the increase in public good provision in particular, are associated with
robust decision-making that arises from the fear of having misspecied the
conditional mean of the stochastic state variables and so do not rely on the
assumption of a convex marginal utility function.
The above incentive e¤ect means that precautious policy can play a
welfare-enhancing role, even when fear of model misspecication proves to
be unfounded. When this corrective role outweighs the misallocation of re-
sources that result in case fears of unfavourable scenarios prove to be un-
founded, robust policy is welfare superior even though its raison dêtre proves
to be unjustied. What is critical is that conservatism of this type helps to
correct for the underlying market imperfection of externalities that lead to
free riding. The intuition here is consistent with that of Dennis (2010), who
shows that the existence of a policy imperfection (in his setup, lack of com-
mitment on the part of the central bank) implies that robust policy plays
an additional corrective role, improving outcomes even when fear of model
misspecication is unfounded. In our setup, the additional corrective channel
leads to a trade-o¤ between the unnecessary costs of precaution and the ben-
ets from the correction of free riding. We nd that these benets dominate
quantitatively for a large range of parameter values, hence robust policy is
welfare-improving even when the fear of model misspecication proves to be
unfounded. This result is di¤erent from the conventional wisdom regarding
robust policy-making in which welfare comparisons between robust and non-
robust policies are typically inconclusive at the point when policy is decided.
At the policy level, it is this inconclusiveness that has led to considerable
debates about the desirability of precautious policies. This is evident, for
instance, in the discussions about whether, or not, to adopt precautionary
policies relating to environmental protection and climate change, health risk
and disease spread, defence systems, nancial regulation, etc. Proponents
of precautionary measures highlight the potentially huge costs of model mis-
specication if societies are not well prepared for a bad scenario. On the
other hand, opponents highlight the large, potentially unnecessary costs of
adopting such measures in the case where fear of the bad scenarioproves
unfounded. Here, we show that robust policy-making, driven by uncertainty
about the model determining the provision of the public good, can be welfare-
enhancing even if the fear of model misspecication proves to be unfounded.
We also consider, as an extension, uncertainty about the economic model,
in addition to environmental model uncertainty. Economic model uncertainty
refers to potential model misspecication that may, for instance, relate to de-
velopments in technology and institutions that a¤ect the productive structure
of the economy. If fears about misspecication of the economic model out-
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weigh those about the environmental model, then precaution primarily takes
the form of increased production, in turn intensifying the incentive to free
ride and reducing the provision of the environmental public good. We also
solve for asymmetric Nash equilibria, where asymmetry relates to which type
of model uncertainty is more important for the two countries. For instance,
consider the case in which the home country enjoys a more certain economic
climate relative to the environmental one, and vice versa in the foreign coun-
try (corresponding to the typical north-south paradigm). Under precautious
policies, this type of asymmetry leads to more intense free riding on the part
of the foreign country compared to the symmetric case: the foreign country
nds it optimal to reduce its environmental quality in order to take advantage
of robust environmental policy adopted by the home country.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In section 2, we present
a simple static model solved analytically to show some key results. The
dynamic model is presented and solved in sections 3 and 4. The main results
are presented and discussed in section 5. In section 6 we extend the model
to add economic model uncertainty. Section 7 closes the paper. Further
details on the solution and the robustness of the quantitative ndings are in
an Appendix.
2 A simple static model
We start out the paper by demonstrating analytically the main idea (namely,
that free-riding decreases with robust policy) using a simple static model with
public good type externalities. The underlying setup is the standard model
of public good provision and voluntary contributions from individual agents.
To this, we add model uncertainty and robust policy, following the relevant
static models in Hansen and Sargent (2008, ch. 6). At this stage, we present
model uncertainty and robust decision-making intuitively, leaving a more
formal presentation and technical details for the following sections.
There are N identical agents indexed by the superscript h = 1; 2; :::; N .
The agents are linked via a public good, which is obtained by aggregating
agentsvoluntary contributions. The budget constraint of each h is
ch + h = yh, (1)
where ch is hs private consumption, h is hs voluntary contribution to a
public good and the parameter yh is an exogenous endowment.
The true model of public good provision is unknown to the agents. Each
agent knows that the total amount of the public good provided, G, is de-
termined by aggregating individual contributions but he also suspects that
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the process of transforming these contributions to e¤ective public good units
is misspecied. Assume, in particular, that for each contribution h, the
e¤ective amount augmenting the public good is given by h + wh, where
wh denotes an unknown distortion and the parameter  scales the e¤ect of
wh. The latter, namely wh, can have many interpretations like agent-specic
shocks with unspecied properties or other unknown individual characteris-
tics and circumstances that may a¤ect e¤ective contributions to the public
good. Therefore, G is given by
G =
P
h

h + wh

N
=
P
h 
h
N
+

P
hw
h
N
, (2)
where we use per capita terms to avoid scale e¤ects in equilibrium.
The basic idea of robust decision making is that a robust decision maker
makes his optimal choices assuming that the unknown wh is determined in a
worst-case scenario. The latter means that wh is chosen by a malevolent
agent with the objective to minimise hs welfare function. Formally, a robust
decision-maker faces the following problem
max
ch;h
min
wh
U =  
2
(ch   c)2   (1  )
2
(G G)2,
subject to (1), (2) and a constraint on the size of wh, namely (wh)2  S,
where S > 0 is a constant that bounds the choice of wh (see subsection 3.2
below for details). In this specication, c and G denote exogenous utility
bliss points for private consumption and public good provision, respectively,
while 0 <  < 1 is the weight given to private consumption relative to the
public good. The constraint (wh)2  S captures the extent of fear of poten-
tial model misspecication in the sense that higher values of S indicate an
increased fear of model misspecication and hence more precautious or ro-
bust policies. The linear-quadratic specication is chosen to match the main
model in the next sections and, as in the literature, to facilitate analytical
results.
Following Hansen and Sargent (2008, ch. 6), we solve the equivalent
multiplierversion of this problem, namely
max
ch;h
min
wh
 
2
(ch   c)2   (1  )
2
(G G)2 + 
2
(wh)2,
where  > 0 is a penalty parameter restraining the choice of wh and which
is inversely related to S (i.e. lower values of  indicate an increased fear of
model misspecication and hence more precautious or robust policies).
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In a non-cooperative Nash setup, each agent takes the actions of other
agents as given. Using the budget constraints to replace ch and G, in a
symmetric Nash equilibrium (we omit the superscript h in the symmetric
solution below), the rst-order conditions for h and wh are respectively
 =
(y   c)  (1 )
N
(w  G)
+ (1 )
N
w =
(1 )
N
(  G)
   (1 )2
N
,
where the second-order condition for wh requires    (1 )2
N
> 0.
Combining the above two conditions, we have the reduced-form solution
for  (the solution for w is omitted)
 =

   (1 )2
N

(y   c) + (1 )
N
G
   (1 )2
N

+ (1 )
N

+ (1 )
2
N2
. (3)
Straightforward comparative statics in the above solution for  imply that
the sign of @
@
is the sign of (y c G). Hence, in the economically interesting
parameter region in which (y   c  G) is negative,3 @
@
is also negative. In
other words, as  falls (meaning that agents become more conservative), 
rises (meaning that the free riding problem becomes milder). Therefore,
robustness works as a substitute to cooperation.
It is interesting to study the welfare implications of robust behaviour when
the fear of model misspecication proves to be unfounded, i.e. when w = 0 ex
post. In a setup without market imperfections, this typically leads to welfare
losses, as a result of unnecessary precautious behaviour, which proves to be
non-optimal ex post. To see what happens in our setup with public good type
externalities, we substitute (3) back into the objective function, set w = 0,
and obtain the partial derivative of utility with respect to 
@U
@
= (ch   c)@
@
  (1  )(G G)@
@
, (4)
so that, if the second term on the right-hand side of (4) dominates the rst
term, this partial is negative implying that more precautious behaviour (i.e.
lower ) increases welfare, even when the fear of model misspecication proves
3In other words, we assume that the bliss or satiation levels of private and public
consumption are large relative to the typical value of income. Notice that y = c + G, so
that the condition (y   c  G) < 0, is equivalent to c+G < c +G (when w = 0).
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to be unfounded.4 Thus, regarding welfare, the e¤ect of  is ambiguous
depending on the magnitude of the two terms on the right-hand side. Below,
in a dynamic and richer model, we will investigate the quantitative trade-o¤
implied in (4) in more detail. However, it is useful to note that the nal result
depends on the extent of under-provision of the public good. In particular,
the worse the social problem of public good under-provision, and thus the
bigger the gap (G   G) is in absolute value, the bigger the quantitative
importance of the second term, and thus of the welfare-enhancing role of
precaution.
3 A dynamic model with externalities and ro-
bust decision making
There are two countries called home (h) and foreign (f) which, for simplicity,
are assumed to be identical. Each country is populated by one representa-
tive agent, who consumes, produces and pollutes the environment. Pollution
occurs as a by-product of production. The two countries are linked via envi-
ronmental quality, which is an international public good. In particular, the
agent in each country values economy-wide, or world, environmental qual-
ity, dened as the weighted average of environmental quality in each country.
Since world environmental quality is treated as a public good, there are stan-
dard free-riding incentives. At the same time, the agent in each country is
uncertain about the true process that generates pollution, or equivalently
environmental quality (for model uncertainty in models with environmental
public goods, see e.g. Athanassoglou and Xepapadeas (2012)).
3.1 Setup
We present the problem for the home country in more detail and just sum-
marise afterwards the symmetric problem for the foreign country. The agent
in the home country derives utility from consumption, cht , where the super-
script h denotes outcomes in the home country, and environmental quality.
The latter is a weighted sum of environmental quality at home, Qh;ht , and
abroad, Qh;ft (the meaning of the double superscript will be discussed below).
4Recall that we work in the economically interesting area with relatively large bliss
points so that (ch   c), (gh  G) and hence @@ are all negative.
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Formally, the within-period utility of the agent in h is given by5
Uht =  

(cht   c)2 + (1  ) (Qh;ht + Qh;ft   (1 + )Q)2

(5)
where c and Q are utility bliss points for consumption and environmental
quality respectively, the parameter 0 <  < 1 measures the extent of envi-
ronmental externalities from one country to the other and, as in the simple
model above, the parameter 0 <  < 1 measures the relative weight given to
consumption.
The agent produces output by using a linear AK-type technology. Sub-
stituting the resource constraint and the production function in the capital
evolution equation, the economic modelin country h is given by
kht+1   (1  )kht + cht = Akht
where kht+1 and k
h
t denote respectively the end-of-period and the beginning-
of-period capital stock, 0 <  < 1 is a depreciation rate and A > 0 is a
technology scale factor.
The agent is uncertain about the environmental model, that is, about
the process of environmental quality. In particular, the truemodel for the
motion of environmental quality is assumed to be
Qh;ht+1 = (1  Q)Qh + QQh;ht   'kht + Q("h;Qt+1 + wh;ht+1) (6)
Qh;ft+1 = (1  Q)Qf + QQh;ft   'kft + Q("f;Qt+1 + wh;ft+1), (7)
where 0 < Q < 1 measures the persistence of environmental quality; Qh
and Qf are constant terms to be further explained below; ' > 0 measures
the extent to which economic activity, as captured by kht and k
f
t , damages
environmental quality; "h;Qt+1 and "
f;Q
t+1 are i:i:d: Gaussian variables distributed
with zero mean and unit variance; wh;ht+1 and w
h;f
t+1 are unknown processes
capturing potential misspecication of the environmental model; and Q
scales the size of "h;Qt+1 and "
f;Q
t+1 and the unknown w
h;h
t+1 and w
h;f
t+1. Hence Q
h
and Qf give the expected long-run values of environmental quality in the two
countries in the absence of economic activity and model misspecication.
The presence of the unknown processes wh;ht+1 and w
h;f
t+1, which may be
functions of the models state variables, implies that the true environmental
model is not known to the agent. Note that the agent in the home country
is uncertain about environmental processes in both countries. Thus, wh;ht+1
5This functional forms for utility and production are chosen so that the problem can
be written in linear-quadratic form (see e.g. Hansen and Sargent (2008, ch. 10) for utility
and Economides and Philippopoulos (2008) for the production function).
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captures model misspecication, as feared by country h, for the environmen-
tal process of country h. Similarly, wh;ft+1, captures model misspecication, as
feared by country h, for the environmental process of country f . This rep-
resentation allows the decision maker to choose allocations under potentially
di¤erent perceptions about the worst-case processes in the two countries.
3.2 Robust decision making
A robust decision maker is an agent who makes decisions that are robust
to model misspecication, in the sense that they give him good results even
in the presence of unfavourable w shocks, where w is dened to include the
unknown perturbations that are relevant for the agent (i.e. in country h,
w includes wh;ht+1 and w
h;f
t+1). In order for his decision rule to assure him a
lower bound on utility in an unfavourable environment, the agent makes his
choices (for consumption, production and investment) as if the unknown w
process follows a worst-case scenario. In particular, he pretends that w is
chosen by a ctional malevolent agent, whose objective is to minimise his (the
agents) objective. By planning against such a worst-case process, he designs
a decision rule that performs well under a set of perturbed models.6 In other
words, the maximising agent uses the malevolent agent as a device to achieve
robustness. This implies that the agent/country solves a maxmin problem.
A robust decision maker makes his choices under a constraint imposed on the
malevolent agent which measures the degree of fear of model misspecication
that characterises the robust decision maker. The tighter the constraint, the
less conservative policy-making is.
To formalise this approach, we need to measure the distance between
the true model and a benchmark model that the decision maker would trust
to be correct in the absence of model misspecication. This benchmark or
approximatingmodel of the motion for environmental quality is
Qh;ht+1 = (1  Q)Qh + QQh;ht   'kht + Qb"h;Qt+1 (8)
Qh;ft+1 = (1  Q)Qf + QQh;ft   'kft + Qb"f;Qt+1, (9)
where b"h;Qt+1 and b"f;Qt+1 are Gaussian variables distributed identically and inde-
pendently through time with zero mean and unit variance. Hence, the true
model is a distortedor perturbedversion of the approximating model.
To measure the di¤erence between the approximating environmental model
and the distorted environmental model for the home country, let xht denote
6By dention, robust choices will be optimal under the worst-case scenario.
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the vector

Qh;ht ; Q
h;f
t

, fh0 denote the one-step transition density associ-
ated with the approximating environmental model and fh denote the one-
step transition density associated with the true, or distorted, environmental
model. Following Hansen and Sargent (2008), we use conditional relative
entropy, dened as the expected log-likelihood ratio of the two models, eval-
uated with respect to the true model, to measure the statistical discrepancy
between the two models in the transition from xht to x
h
t+1
I(fh0 ; f
h)(xh) =
Z
log

fh(xht+1 p xht )
fh0 (x
h
t+1 p xht )

fh(xht+1 p xht )dxht+1, (10)
where it can be shown that
I(fh0 ; f
h)(xh) = 0:5

wh;ht+1
2
+

wh;ft+1
2
.
In turn, the quantity 2E0
1P
t=0
t+1I(fh0 ; f
h)(xh) can be considered as an in-
tertemporal measure of feared model misspecication for the home country,
where 0 <  < 1 is the subjective discount factor and the mathematical
expectation is evaluated with respect to the distorted model.
The restriction that the robust decision maker imposes on the malevolent
agent is thus given by
E0
1X
t=0
t+1

wh;ht+1
2
+

wh;ft+1
2
 ,
where  measures the fear of model misspecication. When  = 0, the
problem collapses to the case where the agent believes that the approximating
model is also the true model. In this case, the agent/country makes choices
without fearing model uncertainty. On the other hand, the higher is , the
more conservative behavior is incorporated in decision making, as the entropy
constraint allows for bigger (and thus more harmful) model misspecication.
3.3 Summarising the countriesproblems
To summarise, given the extent of fear of model misspecication , the home
country solves the following problem
max
fcht g1t=0
min
fwh;ht+1;wh;ft+1g1t=0
E0
1X
t=0
 t

(cht   c)2 + (1  ) (Qh;ht + Qh;ft   (1 + )Q)2

,
(11)
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where the motions of the related state variables are
kht+1   (1  )kht + cht = Akht
Qh;ht+1 = (1  Q)Qh + QQh;ht   'kht + Q("h;Qt+1 + wh;ht+1)
Qh;ft+1 = (1  Q)Qf + QQh;ft   'kft + Q("f;Qt+1 + wh;ft+1),
wh;ht+1 and w
h;f
t+1 satisfy the constraint
E0
1X
t=0
t+1

wh;ht+1
2
+

wh;ft+1
2
  (12)
and the actions of the foreign country are taken as given, and, in particular,
capital in the foreign country follows
kft+1   (1  )kft + cft = Akft .
Note that the entropy constraint in (12) is a constraint that is used for
decision-making purposes only and does not apply to the real, unknown wh;ht+1
and wh;ft+1 processes. In other words, a specic value of  matters for the
perceived wh;ht+1 and w
h;f
t+1 processes, but not for the actual or realised w
h;h
t+1
and wh;ft+1 processes.
The problem of the foreign country is symmetric. We present it for com-
pleteness.
max
fcft g1t=0
min
fwf;ft+1;wf;ht+1g1t=0
E0
1X
t=0
 t

(cft   c)2 + (1  ) (Qf;ft + Qf;ht   (1 + )Q)2

,
(13)
where the motions of the related state variables are
kft+1   (1  )kft + cft = Akft
Qf;ft+1 = (1  Q)Qf + QQf;ft   'kft + Q("f;Qt+1 + wf;ft+1)
Qf;ht+1 = (1  Q)Qh + QQf;ht   'kht + Q("h;Qt+1 + wf;ht+1),
wf;ft+1 and w
f;h
t+1 are dened analogously to w
h;h
t+1 and w
h;f
t+1 and satisfy the
constraint
E0
1X
t=0
t+1

wf;ft+1
2
+

wf;ht+1
2
 
and
kht+1   (1  )kht + cht = Akht .
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Our modeling allows the decision makers in the two countries to choose
economic and environmental allocations under potentially di¤erent percep-
tions about the worst-case processes in the two countries. Thus, for the
purposes of robust decision making, we do not impose wh;ht+1 = w
f;h
t+1 and
wf;ft+1 = w
h;f
t+1 and thus we do not impose Q
h;h
t+1 = Q
f;h
t+1 and Q
f;f
t+1 = Q
h;f
t+1. Of
course, given that all w represent a ctional device in the robust problem
used only to determine the choices for the variables under the control of the
maximising agents, the actual process for environmental quality must sat-
isfy Qh;ht+1 = Q
f;h
t+1  Qht+1 and Qf;ft+1 = Qh;ft+1  Qft+1 ex post. In the special
case in which wh;ht+1 = w
f;h
t+1  whh;t+1 = 0 and wf;ft+1 = wh;ft+1  wff;t+1 = 0;
the problem collapses to the standard case without model uncertainty, where
Qh;ht+1 = Q
f;h
t+1  Qht+1 and Qf;ft+1 = Qh;ft+1  Qft+1. For the more general case
with robust policy making, when we simulate the solution to the model,
there will be one process for Qh;ht+1 = Q
f;h
t+1  Qht+1 and one process for
Qf;ft+1 = Q
h;f
t+1  Qft+1 ex post, as there is a single exogenous realisation of
whh;t+1 and w
f
f;t+1 respectively.
4 Nash equilibrium with robust policies
In this section, we solve a Nash game between the two countries when, at the
same time, there is a maxmin (robust control) problem within each country.
Thus, each country chooses its robust policies (i.e. it solves its maxmin
problem) by taking the robust policies of the other country (i.e. the maxmin
problem of the other country) as given.
4.1 Linear-quadratic representation of the problem
4.1.1 Home country
We rst present the problem of the home country. By dening echt  cht   c,ecft  cft   c, eQh;ht  Qh;ht   Q, eQh;ft  Qh;ft   Q, eQf;ft  Qf;ft   Q andeQf;ht  Qf;ht  Q, we can rewrite the problem as
max
fecht g1t=0 minfwh;ht+1;wh;ft+1g1t=0E0
1X
t=0
 t

(echt )2 + (1  ) ( eQh;ht +  eQh;ft )2 , (14)
where the motions of the related state variables are
kht+1 =  c + (A+ 1  ) kht   echt (15)
kft+1 =  c + (A+ 1  ) kft   ecft (16)
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eQh;ht+1 = (1  Q)Qh +  Q   1Q + Q eQh;ht   'kht + Q("h;Qt+1 + wh;ht+1) (17)eQh;ft+1 = (1  Q)Qf +  Q   1Q + Q eQh;ft   'kft + Q("f;Qt+1 + wh;ft+1) (18)eQf;ft+1 = (1  Q)Qf +  Q   1Q + Q eQf;ft   'kft + Q("f;Qt+1 + wf;ft+1) (19)eQf;ht+1 = (1  Q)Qh +  Q   1Q + Q eQf;ht   'kht + Q("h;Qt+1 + wf;ht+1), (20)
and
E0
1X
t=0
t+1

wh;ht+1
2
+

wh;ft+1
2
 . (21)
Let eh equal the number of states 1; kht ; kft ; eQh;ht ; eQh;ft ; eQf;ft ; eQf;ht ; nh;max
equal the number of controls (echt ) for the maximising agent in the home
country; nh;min equal the number of controls

wh;ht+1; w
h;f
t+1

for the minimising
agent in the home country; nf;max equal the number of controls (ecft ) for the
maximising agent in the foreign country; nf;min equal the number of controls
wf;ft+1; w
f;h
t+1

for the minimising agent in the foreign country; and nex equal
the number of exogenous shocks

"h;Qt+1; "
f;Q
t+1

. We can now write the linear
constraints in (15)-(20) above in matrix form as
xt+1 = Axt +B
huht +B
fuft + C"t+1 +D
hwht+1 +D
fwft+1,
where
xt =
h
1 kht k
f
t
eQh;ht eQh;ft eQf;ft eQf;ht i0 ;
uht =
echt 0 ; uft = hecft i0 ;
wht+1 =

wh;ht+1 w
h;f
t+1
0
; wft+1 =

wf;ft+1 w
f;h
t+1
0
;
"t+1 =

"h;Qt+1 "
f;Q
t+1
0
;
A(ehxeh) =
2666666664
1 0 0 0 0 0 0
 c A+ 1   0 0 0 0 0
 c 0 A+ 1   0 0 0 0
(1  Q)Qh +  Q   1Q  ' 0 Q 0 0 0
(1  Q)Qf +  Q   1Q 0  ' 0 Q 0 0
(1  Q)Qf +  Q   1Q 0  ' 0 0 Q 0
(1  Q)Qh +  Q   1Q  ' 0 0 0 0 Q
3777777775
;
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Bh
(ehxnh;max) =
2666666664
0
 1
0
0
0
0
0
3777777775
; Bf
(ehxnf;max) =
2666666664
0
0
 1
0
0
0
0
3777777775
;
C(ehxnex) =
2666666664
0 0
0 0
0 0
Q 0
0 Q
0 Q
Q 0
3777777775
; Dh
(ehxnh;min) =
2666666664
0 0
0 0
0 0
Q 0
0 Q
0 0
0 0
3777777775
; Df
(ehxnf;min) =
2666666664
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
0 0
Q 0
0 Q
3777777775
Following Hansen and Sargent (2008), we solve the multiplier version of
this problem, by adding the entropy constraint, (21), to the objective function
with a time-invariant multiplier, denoted as , so that we rewrite the problem
of the home country as
max
fuht g1t=0
min
fwht+1g1t=0
E0
1X
t=0
t
n 
uht
0
Rhuu
h
t +
 
wht+1
0
Rhww
h
t+1 + x
0
tQ
hxt
o
, (22)
subject to
xt+1 = Axt +B
huht +B
fuft + C"t+1 +D
hwht+1 +D
fwft+1, (23)
where
Rh
u(nh;maxxnh;max)
= [ ] ; Rh
w(nf;minxnf;min)
=

 0
0 

;
Qh
(ehxeh) =
2666666664
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0   (1  )   ((1  ) ) 0 0
0 0 0   ((1  ) )   (1  ) 2 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
3777777775
As said above, the nonnegative multiplier, , is a penalty on the min-
imising agent for choosing policies that reduce welfare for the maximising
agent and can be used as a measure of the degree of robustness. The value
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of  is inversely related to the value of , so that the lower is , the higher
the degree of robustness. We require Rhu to be negative denite, Q
h to be
negative semi-denite and Rhw to be positive denite (see also Anderson et
al. (1996), and Hansen and Sargent (2008), for assumptions regarding the
coe¢ cient matrices for linear-quadratic problems).
To solve each countrys maxmin problem, we solve for Markov strategies
in a Nash game between the maximising and the minimising agent. To im-
plement this solution, we use the observation that in (22)-(23), the rst-order
conditions of the maximising agent with respect to uht and of the minimising
agent with respect to wht+1, are the same as the rst-order conditions of an
ordinary (i.e. non-robust) optimal linear regulator (OLR) who chooses euht ,
where euht(enx1) =   uh0t wh0t+1 0 (see also Hansen and Sargent (2008, ch. 2)).
Hence, we write the extremisation7 problem in (22)-(23) as
ext
feuht g1t=0E0
1X
t=0
t
n euht 0Rheuht + x0tQhxto (24)
xt+1 = Axt + eBheuht + eBfeuft + Ct+1, (25)
where
Rh(enxen) =
 
Rhu

0(nh;maxxnh;min)
0(nh;minxnh;max)

Rhw
 
and eBh
(ehxen) =

Bh Dh

, euft(enx1) =   uf 0t wf 0t+1 0, eBf(ehxen) = Bf Df anden = nh;max + nh;min = nf;max + nf;min.
4.1.2 Foreign country
Working similarly, the extremisation problem in the foreign country is given
by
ext
feuft g1t=0E0
1X
t=0
t
euft 0Rfeuft + x0tQfxt
xt+1 = Axt + eBheuht + eBfeuft + Ct+1,
where the matrices A, eBh, eBfand C and the vectors xt, euht , euft and t+1 are
as above and
Rf(enxen) =
 
Rfu

0(nf;maxxnf;min)
0(nf;minxnf;max)

Rfw
  ,
Rf
u(nf;maxxnf;max)
= [ ] ; Rf
w(nf;minxnf;;min)
=

 0
0 

;
7Following Whittle (1990), extremisation denotes joint maximisation and minimisation.
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Qf
(ehxeh) =
2666666664
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0   (1  )   ((1  ) )
0 0 0 0 0   ((1  ) )   (1  ) 2
3777777775
.
4.2 Nash game in Markov strategies between countries
We are now ready to solve the Nash game between countries and between
the benevolent and the malevolent agent within each country. We solve for
Markov strategies in this game. The Nash equilibrium will then be obtained
by combining the rst-order conditions of both countries.
4.2.1 Bellman equations
We make use of a type of certainty equivalence, which applies to the class
of linear-quadratic games relevant here (see e.g. Hansen and Sargent, 2008,
ch. 2). In particular, the decision rules for both the maximising and the
minimising agents in the maxmin game are the same in a particular non-
stochastic version of the problem, where "t+1 = 0. Therefore, we focus on
the problem
ext
feuht g1t=0
1X
t=0
t
n euht 0Rheuht + x0tQhxto (26)
xt+1 = Axt + eBheuht + eBfeuft . (27)
The Bellman equation for the extremisation problem is
vh(x) = exteuh
n euh0Rheuh + x0Qhx+ vh(ex)o , (28)
where vh(x) is the value function, x is current periods state, ex is next periods
state. We guess that the value function for the extremisation problem is
quadratic
vh(x) = x0P hx, (29)
where P h is a negative semidenite symmetric (eh eh) matrix. Substituting
the guess function in (28) the Bellman equation gives
x0P hx = exteuh
n euh0Rheuh + x0Qhx+ ex0P hexo . (30)
The Bellman equation for the foreign country is symmetric to the above,
obtained by substituting the superscript h with f and f with h.
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4.2.2 Recursive solution
We describe in detail in Appendix A how to obtain the solution for this
problem, rst, by combining the rst-order conditions for the two countries
and solving the system to obtain the Nash equilibrium given the guesses for
P h and P f , and, then, by obtaining P h and P f and verifying the guessed form
for the solution and iterating on the resulting system of Riccati equations.
The solution is summarised by the following recursive, state-space formeuht = Fxt,euft = Kxt and (31)
xt+1 = Axt + eBheuht + eBfeuft + Ct+1, or
xt+1 =

A+ eBhF + eBfKxt + Ct+1.
Working backwards, an appropriate partitioning of the matrix F will give us
the policy function for uht and the worst case scenario for w
h
t+1
uht = F
uxt
wht+1 = F
wxt, (32)
and, similarly, an appropriate partitioning of the matrix K will give us the
policy function for uft and the worst case scenario for w
f
t+1
uft = K
uxt
wft+1 = K
wxt. (33)
We can therefore summarise the solution as
uht = F
uxt (34)
wht+1 = F
wxt (35)
uft = K
uxt (36)
wft+1 = K
wxt (37)
xt+1 =
 
A+BhF u +BfKu

xt+ (38)
+Dhwht+1 +D
fwft+1 + Ct+1.
5 Implications of robust policy in a Nash
equilibrium
As discussed earlier, the malevolent agent, or else the worst-case scenario, is
only used as a ctional device by the conservative decision-maker in order to
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achieve robustness. The actual model will be given in general by
uht = F
uxt (39)
uft = K
uxt (40)
xt+1 =
 
A+BhF u +BfKu

xt+ (41)
+Dhwht+1 +D
fwft+1,
where wht+1 and w
f
t+1 follow unknown processes, and not necessarily the worst-
case processes in (32) and (33).8 Note that the matrices F and K (and thus
F u and Ku) depend on the models parameters and thus on  as well. Hence,
fear of model misspecication, i.e. the value of , a¤ects the robust policies
uht and u
f
t chosen by the countries, which in turn matter for the evolution
of the state equation, although the actual wht+1 and w
f
t+1 are independent of
. For instance, if the countries ignore model uncertainty in their choices,
so that  ! 1 in (39)-(41), the unknown processes wht+1 and wft+1 do not
disappear.
To calculate equilibrium outcomes and welfare for di¤erent values of , we
assume that, at time period 0, the equilibrium is given by the steady state of
the Nash equilibrium under model certainty9 and then simulate the solution
following (39)-(41), conditional on specic ex post scenarios regarding the
processes
n
wht+1; w
f
t+1
oT
t=0
that will be discussed below. The time horizon for
the simulations is T = 300 years.
The parameter values used for the numerical solutions of the model are
given in Table 1. The economic and environmental parameters are similar to
those commonly used in the literature (see e.g. Angelopoulos et al. (2013)
for references). The target values for consumption and environmental quality
and the productivity parameters are chosen to ensure interior, well-dened
solutions for the economic and environmental variables in the model. A
sensitivity analysis for the quantitative e¤ect of the parameters is conducted
and summarised below.
Table 1: Parameter values
  c Q   A ' Qh Qf Q Q
0.97 0.7 1.5 2 0.8 0.1 2 0.05 1 1 0.95 0.01
8The representation in (39)-(41) encompasses (34)-(38) as a special case, in particular
when the unknown processes in (39)-(41) follow the feared worst-case scenario in (34)-(38).
For simplicity, we turn o¤ all random shocks associated with the known distribution "t+1.
9Note that this is equivalent to assuming that at time 0 the equilibrium is given by
the steady state of the Nash equilibrium without fear of model misspecication in policies
(i.e. when  !1) and fear of model misspecication proves to be unfounded ex post, i.e.
wht+1 = w
f
t+1 = 0, rt, in (39)-(41).
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5.1 Scenarios studied
We examine equilibrium outcomes under di¤erent scenarios for
n
wht+1; w
f
t+1
oT
t=0
.
In particular, we rst examine outcomes under two examples of bad scenar-
ios, i.e. under negative realisations of model uncertainty. At the other
extreme, we examine outcomes in the limiting case where the fear of model
misspecication proves to be unfounded. These scenarios demonstrate the
two key results of the model, namely, the increased public good provision
under robust policies and the ex ante welfare superiority of robust policies.
In the case of bad scenarios, we present examples when the unknown
distributions associated with model uncertainty always take negative values.
In particular, for the results presented in the Tables below, we assume that
the values for the model misspecication variables do not follow the worst-
case scenario, as given by (35) and (37), but are equal to the absolute of values
drawn from a standard normal, multiplied by  2  Q to obtain a very bad
scenario and by  Q to obtain a bad scenario. We thus simulate the
model as given in (39)-(41), where wht+1 and w
f
t+1 take these negative values.
We examine cases of such bad scenariosand not the worst-casescenario,
as, under the worst-case scenario, robust policy is optimal by denition.
These examples serve to capture the potential benets of robust, relative to
non-robust, policy-making in adverse outcomes of model misspecication.
In the case of unfounded fear of model misspecication, we present results
by simulating robust and non-robust policies under the approximating model.
This is obtained by setting wht+1 = w
f
t+1  0 in equations (39)-(41). The
latter implies that the approximating model is the correct one; however,
the agents, being precautious, have solved for robust decision rules (see e.g.
Hansen and Sargent (2008, ch. 2)). This serves to capture the potential cost
of robust policy-making when the fear of model misspecication proves to be
unfounded.
5.2 Main results
Table 2 presents results for the home country (results for the foreign country
are identical since here we solve for a symmetric equilibrium). Robust poli-
cies are numerically implemented by a relatively low value of , i.e.  = 0:02,
while a high value of , i.e.  = 106, approximates non-robust policies re-
ecting the absence of fear of model misspecication. We report outcomes
for consumption (c), capital (k), output (y), environmental quantity (Q) and
utility (u) in the long run, under all cases. We also report discounted lifetime
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welfare (U).10
Table 2: Outcomes for robust and non-robust policies
Fear is founded Fear is founded Fear is unfounded
(very bad scenario) (bad scenario)
 = 0:02  = 106  = 0:02  = 106  = 0:02  = 106
c 1.006 1.136 1.026 1.214 1.047 1.170
k 0.530 0.598 0.540 0.607 0.551 0.616
y 1.059 1.196 1.081 1.141 1.102 1.231
Q 0.164 0.096 0.307 0.240 0.449 0.385
u -3.447 -3.618 -2.944 -3.095 -2.482 -2.613
U -105.954 -108.393 -95.235 -97.384 -85.232 -87.102
Starting with outcomes under bad scenarios, we see that there are gains
from following robust policies, both in the long run and over lifetime. As
can be seen, the preference for robustness triggers a form of precautionary
behaviour, in the form of better environmental protection at the cost of out-
put, and this acts as a bu¤er against the bad environmental realisations (see
also e.g. Vardas and Xepapadeas (2010) and Athanassoglou and Xepapadeas
(2012) on precautionary environmental behaviour resulting from robust de-
cision making).
We then evaluate outcomes and welfare when the fear is unfounded ex
post. The results in Table 2 conrm that environmental quality is improved
under precautious policies and that there are welfare gains from following
robust policies even when the fear of model misspecication proves to be
unfounded. Thus, in a second-best environment, robust policy-making is
not redundant and can outperform non-robust policy, even when its raison
dêtre, namely, model misspecication, is not fullled. This is because the
precautionary principle corrects for the under-provision of the public good.
Environmental protection is ine¢ ciently low in a Nash equilibrium and robust
policy-making helps to remedy this, irrespective of whether fears of model
misspecication are founded or not. To put it di¤erently, robust behaviour
works as a substitute for cooperation. This intuition is consistent with the
analysis in Dennis (2010), where the cost of robustness, even when the fear
10All results presented here are obtained, as discussed above, by excluding cooperation
between the countries. We have also solved the model under the assumption that the
countries can cooperate on economic and environmental policies, so that the external-
ities are internalised. This cooperative solution, as expected, results in higher welfare
compared to the Nash equilibrium. Moreover, it reproduces the standard results of the
literature on robust control, i.e. that there are welfare gains from following robust policies
under bad outcomes of nature and that robustness premia emerge when fears of model
misspecication are unfounded ex post.
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of model misspecication is unfounded, is eliminated because robust policy-
making serves to correct for a policy failure, namely, the lack of commitment
on the part of monetary authorities. Similarly, in our model, robust policy-
making serves to correct for a market failure, namely, externalities that result
in free-riding and under-provision of public goods.
Our rst result, namely that robust policies increase the provision of pub-
lic good and hence mitigate the free-riding problem, is the outcome of the
incentives embedded into robust decision-making under model uncertainty
(see also the simple model in section 2). This nding complements and ex-
tends the related literature that has focused on the role of uncertainty, in the
form of exogenous stochastic processes within a known model for the decision
maker, in correcting free-riding problems. As said in the Introduction, the
public economics literature has studied extensively whether extrinsic uncer-
tainty can lead atomistic risk-averse individuals to increase their voluntary
contribution to the public good (see e.g. Cornes and Sandler (1996, ch. 6)
and Keenan et al. (2006)). Such uncertainty, in the form of exogenous sto-
chastic processes with known statistical properties can, for instance, refer to
the provision of the public good supplied by others, to productivity processes,
etc. In the context of environmental public good-type situations, the same
literature has also shown that global environmental quality can be improved,
if the environmental model admits bigger exogenous disturbances (see e.g.
Bramoullé and Treich (2009)). Typically in these studies, the conditions
under which an alleviation of the commons problem is possible under uncer-
tainty involve assumptions about the risk-aversion and prudence embodied
in the utility function, e.g. assumptions about the convexity of the marginal
utility function.
Our ndings contribute to this literature in several ways. First, we study a
di¤erent and more general form of uncertainty, i.e. model uncertainty, which
refers to the potential (in)correct specication of the model that determines
the quantity of the public good and which is allowed to feed back to the
state of the system, therefore it is not necessarily exogenous to the decision
maker. This type of uncertainty is particularly relevant for environmental
processes (see e.g. the examples of environmental uncertainty in Barrett
(2008) and Bramoullé and Treich (2009)). Second, the result that there is an
increase in the quantity of the public good provided does not require further
assumptions on the utility function.11 Third, we study explicitly the dynamic
11For instance, typically, a positive third derivative of the utility function is required to
generate precautionary behaviour, in the form of increases in stock variables in dynamic
models, when uncertainty takes the form of mean-preserving increases in the variance of
exogenous processes (see e.g. the review and analysis in Ljungqvist and Sargent (2012)).
By contrast, the third derivative of the quadratic utility function employed here is zero.
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interaction between the environmental process and economic activity, which
is also relevant for environmental problems.
Our work therefore contributes to the growing literature on mechanisms
that can alleviate the free-riding problem in environmental public good provi-
sion. A related literature has also studied the e¤ect of extrinsic uncertainty
on international environmental agreements (see e.g. Na and Shin (1998),
Boucher and Bramoullé (2010) and Finus and Pintassilgo (2012)) and sug-
gests that uncertainty can increase public good provision by increasing the
incentives for cooperation. An alternative channel that can contribute to im-
proving environmental standards in a non-cooperative setup is one that works
through terms of trade incentives (see e.g. Bogmans (2015) and Markusen
(2014)). In particular, when countries trade in di¤erentiated commodities,
environmental policies can improve terms-of-trade and this creates an incen-
tive in favour of environmental policies, which works against the standard
free-riding incentive. This consideration is strengthened quantitatively when
vertical linkages are strong, that is, when production is increasingly organised
by means of global supply chains.
Regarding our second result, namely that there are welfare gains from pre-
cautious policy even when the fear of model misspecication is unfounded,
as already shown in the simple static model of section 2, the welfare ef-
fects from robust policymaking depend on the quantitative strength of the
channels embedded in the model determining the costs and benets of pre-
cautious policies. In a second-best environment with market failures like
externalities, there is a trade-o¤ regarding the e¤ects of model uncertainty
and robust policy-making on welfare. On one hand, robust policy-making in-
creases public good provision for the reasons discussed above. The benecial
impact of this channel on welfare depends on the distortions implied by the
underlying strategic interactions and externalities. In particular, the more
under-provided the public good is in a decentralised equilibrium, the higher
the benet from robust policies. On the other hand, robust policies may im-
ply costs, in the form of misallocation of resources, when the actual outcomes
from model misspecication are not very di¤erent from the approximating
model that can be used for non-robust policy. This trade-o¤ results from in-
troducing the market failure leading to under-provision of public goods into
an equilibrium with robust policies. In the absence of this extra channel,
robust policy is unambiguously associated with robustness premia when the
fear of model misspecication proves to be unfounded.
Therefore, in general, the net welfare e¤ect of robust policy-making de-
pends on a quantitative evaluation of the above trade-o¤ and, as such, it
depends on the parameterisation of the model and, in particular, on the
strength of externalities, the valuation of the public good and the calibration
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of the assumed process for pollution and environmental quality. In terms
of our model, the parameterisation used in Table 1 implies that there are
welfare gains from robust policies, even when the fear of model misspecica-
tion proves to be unfounded. This welfare result is robust to a large range
of parameter values encompassing those reported in Table 1. An extensive
sensitivity analysis of the welfare gains, or losses, arising from robust pol-
icy when the fear of model misspecication is unfounded is summarised in
Appendix B and o¤ers two main results. First, as expected, changes in para-
meters that imply, directly or indirectly, a reduction in the under-provision
of the environmental public good in the Nash equilibrium, and thus a re-
duction in the corrective role of precautious environmental policy, lead to
a reduction in the welfare gains from robust policy when the fear of model
misspecication proves to be unfounded. Second, the nding that there are
welfare gains from precautious environmental policy, that is, in terms of our
solution, by choosing policies for  = 0:02 compared with  = 106, when the
fear of model misspecication is unfounded, is robust to sizeable changes in
the baseline parameter values reported in Table 1.
To further evaluate the e¤ect of the precautionary principle on economic
and environmental outcomes, Figure 1 plots the transition path of the system
from time 0, when robust policies start to be implemented, until the system
converges to the new steady state under the assumption that the fear of
model misspecication is unfounded.
[Figure 1 here]
As shown in Figure 1, the economy starts from the non-robust equilibrium
under model certainty, as given by the last column in Table 2, and converges
towards the steady state captured by the immediately preceding column in
Table 2. The incentive for robust policies is manifested by increases over time
in environmental quality, which reect the desire to create a bu¤er stock of
environmental capital, as discussed above. This is achieved at the expense
of lower production.
6 Economic and environmental uncertainty
In our analysis so far we have allowed for environmental model uncertainty
only. However, country-decision makers may also be uncertain about the
economicmodel. For example, they may worry about potential misspeci-
cation of the process that determines the evolution of economic output, as
captured in this model by the process for physical capital. This may reect,
for instance, fears about technology shocks, social tensions or external threats
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that can impact negatively on infrastructure and output. We generalise the
model presented in Section 3 by also allowing for economicmodel uncer-
tainty, in addition to environmentalmodel uncertainty, and by examining
outcomes for di¤erent types (and sizes) of model uncertainty. Moreover, we
will also study the case of asymmetric equilibria, in the sense that di¤erent
countries, linked by environmental externalities, may have di¤erent preoccu-
pations with di¤erent types of model uncertainty; for instance, one country is
particularly preoccupied with un-modelled shocks to the economic structure
relative to the environmental one, and vice versa for the other country.
6.1 Extended set up
We present the problem for the home country (the foreign countrys problem
is symmetric). The environmentalmodel remains as in Section 3. The
economic modelin country h is given by
kht+1   (1  )kht + cht = Akht + k("h;kt+1 + zht+1), (42)
where "h;kt+1 is an i:i:d: Gaussian variable distributed with zero mean and unit
variance as above, zht+1 is an unknown process that may a¤ect the economic
model and k scales the size of "h;kt+1 and z
h
t+1. The approximating model in
this case is given by
kht+1   (1  )kht + cht = Akht + k(b"h;kt+1), (43)
where b"h;kt+1 is an i:i:d: Gaussian variable distributed with zero mean and unit
variance.
Let fk;h0 denote the one-step transition density associated with the approx-
imating economic model and fk;h the one-step transition density associated
with the true, or distorted, economic model, so that
I(fk;h0 ; f
k;h)(kh) =
Z
log
 
fk;h(kht+1 p kht )
fk;h0 (k
h
t+1 p kht )
!
fk;h(kht+1 p kht )dkht+1
and again
I(fk;h0 ; f
k;h)(kh) = 0:5
 
zht+1
2
.
To summarise, given the extent of fear of model misspecication with
respect to the economic model, k, the home country solves the following
problem
max
fcht g1t=0
min
fwh;ht+1;wh;ft+1;zht+1g1t=0
E0
1X
t=0
 t

(cht   c)2 + (1  ) (Qh;ht + Qh;ft   (1 + )Q)2

(44)
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where the motion of the related state variables is given by
kh;ht+1   (1  )kh;ht + cht = Akh;ht + k("h;kt+1 + zh;ht+1)
kh;ft+1   (1  )kh;ft + cft = Akh;ft + k("f;kt+1 + zh;ft+1)
Qh;ht+1 = (1  Q)Qh + QQh;ht   'kh;ht + Q("h;Qt+1 + wh;ht+1)
Qh;ft+1 = (1  Q)Qf + QQh;ft   'kh;ft + Q("f;Qt+1 + wh;ft+1),
wh;ht+1 and w
h;f
t+1 satisfy the constraint
E0
1X
t=0
t+1

wh;ht+1
2
+

wh;ft+1
2
 , (45)
and zh;ht+1 satises the constraint
E0
1X
t=0
t+1
 
zht+1
2  k. (46)
Using the appropriate denitions for deviations from targets as previously,
we can write the model in linear-quadratic form and then proceed to solve
this more general model in the same way as the model solved above with
environmental uncertainty only. When analysing results below in this set
up, we focus on the situation where the fear of model misspecication proves
to be unfounded.
6.2 Symmetric Nash equilibria with both types of un-
certainty
To illustrate the e¤ect of economic model uncertainty, and its importance
relative to environmental model uncertainty, Table 3 presents outcomes of
symmetric Nash equilibria, with the same parameterisation as in Table 1,
under di¤erent assumptions regarding which type of model uncertainty and
which fear of model misspecication prevails in decision making (even though
both types of fear of model misspecication prove to be unfounded). We
denote by  the multiplier associated with (45), i.e. measuring the extent of
fear of misspecication of the environmental model, and by k the multiplier
associated with (46), i.e. measuring the extent of fear of misspecication of
the economic model. The rst column in Table 3 presents the benchmark
case where policy is non-robust and the fear of model misspecication proves
to be unfounded, which is obtained by setting both  and k to 106 and
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the processes capturing economic and environmental model uncertainty to
be zero ex post, i.e. when simulating the model. As expected, these results
are identical to those in the last column in Table 2.12
Table 3: Outcomes when fear is unfounded in a symmetric equilibrium
; k = 106  = 106; k = 0:02  = 0:02; k = 0:02  = 0:5; k = 0:02
c 1.170 1.173 1.052 1.170
k 0.616 0.618 0.554 0.616
y 1.231 1.235 1.107 1.231
Q 0.385 0.383 0.446 0.384
u -2.613 -2.618 -2.487 -2.614
U -87.102 -87.170 -85.290 -87.111
The second column of results in Table 3 considers the implications of
robust policies when there is fear of misspecication of the economic model
only, and this fear proves to be unfounded (this is captured by setting  = 106
and k = 0:02). The results conrm the intuition that, in this case, outcomes
are worse relative to those in the rst column; namely, when precautious
policy does not correct a market failure, and its raison dêtre proves to be
unfounded, it represents an unnecessary diversion of resources. Precautious
policy, in this case, implies an increase in economic activity (higher capital
stock and thus higher production and consumption in the long run) which
is, however, at the cost of lower environmental quality. Hence, the outcome
is in stark contrast to the results under robust policies incorporating a fear
of misspecifying the environmental model only, shown in Table 2.
Obviously, when both types of model uncertainty inuence decision mak-
ing, the nal result depends on the quantitative strength of each type. Two
cases that show that either outcome is indeed possible are shown in the last
two columns of Table 3. In the rst case (see second column from the end),
when the fear of model misspecication is the same for the two types of
model uncertainty, the correction to the underlying market failure prevails,
the provision of the environmental public good is increased and welfare is im-
proved. In other words, under the parameterisation used here, the positive
12As previously in Table 2, the lifetime welfare numbers in column 1 are obtained by
initialising the simulations from the long-run of this scenario, i.e. the values of the state
variables in this column. All remaining experiments in Tables 3 and 4 will be initialised
from this set of initial conditions, so that results are comparable. Moreover, in all experi-
ments in Tables 3 and 4, all processes relating to model uncertainty are set to zero when
simulating the model.
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e¤ects associated with environmental model uncertainty are stronger than
the negative e¤ects arising from economic model uncertainty. We need to
consider sizeable di¤erences between  and k to over-turn this result and
obtain robustness premia. The last column in Table 3 provides such an
example when we set  = 0:5 and k = 0:02.
6.3 Asymmetric Nash equilibria with both types of un-
certainty
An interesting result emerges when we examine asymmetric equilibria, where
asymmetry refers to di¤erences in the degree of fear of misspecifying the
economic model, relative to the environmental model, in the two countries.
Imagine a situation where the home country is characterised by a relatively
stable economic environment, but there exists uncertainty about the process
of the environmental public good. On the contrary, imagine that the foreign
country is unstable in economic (and perhaps sociopolitical) terms, so that,
in that country, uncertainty about the economic model prevails relative to
uncertainty about the environmental model. To capture this situation, we
consider two experiments and summarise the ndings in Table 4.
Table 4: Outcomes when fear is unfounded in an asymmetric equilibrium
Case 1 Case 2
Home Foreign Home Foreign
 = 0:02  = 106  = 0:02  = 0:02
k = 106 k = 0:02 k = 106 k = 0:02
c 1.030 1.184 1.047 1.052
k 0.542 0.623 0.551 0.554
y 1.084 1.247 1.102 1.107
Q 0.458 0.377 0.449 0.446
u -2.575 -2.518 -2.486 -2.483
U -87.260 -85.098 -85.306 -85.216
First, we set  = 0:02 and k = 106 in the home country and  = 106
and k = 0:02 in the foreign country, meaning that the home country is
concerned more about environmental type uncertainty than economic one,
and vice versa for the foreign country. The Nash equilibrium from this
scenario is reported as case 1 in Table 4. Second, we present results when
both countries have the same fear of misspecifying the environmental model,
i.e.  = 0:02 in both countries, but we also set k = 106 in the home country
and k = 0:02 in the foreign country, meaning that the home country enjoys
a higher degree of economic certainty than the foreign country but they both
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share the same degree of fear of misspecifying the environmental model. This
is reported as case 2 in Table 4. In both cases, we focus on the situation in
which the fears of model misspecication are unfounded.
As can be seen, this type of asymmetry leads to a more intense free rid-
ing on the part of the country which is, in relative terms, preoccupied with
economic model uncertainty, the foreign country in these examples. In par-
ticular, in the rst example in Case 1, the foreign country nds it optimal
to increase its economic activity and reduce its environmental quality even
more as compared to the symmetric case (compare Case 1 in Table 4 to the
rst two columns in Table 3) by optimally taking advantage of the environ-
mental precaution in the home country. On the contrary, although the home
country increases the quantity of its environmental public good, it su¤ers
welfare losses when the fear of model misspecication is unfounded. There-
fore, in such a non-symmetric world, one-sided precautious environmental
policy will not improve welfare ex ante for the country that implements it,
so that coordination with respect to the degree of precaution is required.
In the second example, Case 2 in Table 4, although both countries follow
precautious environmental policies, the additional precaution expressed in
terms of increased production and capital accumulation in the foreign coun-
try, stemming from its concern about economic model uncertainty, implies
that this country ends up with a higher capital stock and lower environmental
quality than the home country. Therefore, although both countries benet
from precautious environmental policies which corrects the under-provision
of the environmental public good (compare Case 2 in Table 4 to the rst
column in Table 3), it is the foreign country that gains more.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the benets of robust policy in a two-country
setup with environmental externalities and fear of model misspecication.
Solving a dynamic noncooperative Nash game, we showed that robust poli-
cies can out-perform non-robust policies, even when the fear of model mis-
specication proves to be unfounded; this happens when the predominant
fear of model misspecication is about the environmental process. The key
mechanism behind this result is that the precautionary principle, associated
with robustness, corrects for the ine¢ ciencies caused by the standard incen-
tive for free riding. We found that, for a wide range of parameters capturing
environmental preferences and externalities in our model, the benets of pre-
cautionary policy, the form of increased public good provision, outweigh the
costs even when the fear of model misspecication is unfounded.
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These ndings demonstrate the potential role of robust policies in improv-
ing economic outcomes even when the common motivation for implementing
them (i.e. protection against bad scenarios associated with model uncer-
tainty) is not justied ex post. In turn, this also suggests that it would be
valuable to conduct further research on the conditions under which robust
policies constitute the equilibrium outcome. This is particularly important
given the result in this paper that there are gains for decision makers that do
not follow precautious policies when others do so, in an environment where
externalities create spill-over e¤ects.
Finally, it would be useful to consider additional or alternative mecha-
nisms to improve environmental quality in the context of model uncertainty
and robust policy, by focusing on di¤erent factors contributing to under-
provision of the environmental public good. For instance, to the extent that
environmental deterioration is also due to the lobbying activities of specic
groups within a country, it would be useful to evaluate under what conditions
model uncertainty, and the implied precautionary behaviour, can intensify
or reduce this lobbying and resulting pollution. When model uncertainty
relates to the cost of environmental protection for the interest group con-
cerned, robust lobbyists would be expected to increase lobbying to avoid
pro-environmental policies, whereas, when model uncertainty relates to the
cost of lobbying, robust lobbyists should reduce lobbying activity.
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8 Appendix A
To obtain the solution in (31), we rst use (30) for the home country and
the transition law in (27) to eliminate next periods state
x0P hx = exteuh f
 euh0Rheuh + x0Qhx+


Ax+ eBheuh + eBfeuf0 P h Ax+ eBheuh + eBfeufg.
The above equation implies
x0P hx = exteuh f
 euh0Rheuh + x0Qhx+ x0A0P hAx+ x0A0P h eBheuh+
x0A0P h eBfeuf +   euh0  eBh0 P hAx+   euh0  eBh0 P h eBheuh+

 euh0  eBh0 P h eBfeuf +   euf0  eBf0 P hAx+ (47)

 euf0  eBf0 P h eBheuh +   euf0  eBf0 P h eBfeufg.
The Bellman equation for the foreign country is symmetric to the above,
where it su¢ ces to substitute the superscript h with f and f with h.
8.1 First-order conditions
The rst order condition with respect to euh that is necessary for the max-
imisation problem on the right-hand side of (47) implies
euh =   Rh +   eBh0 P h eBh 1  eBh0 P hAx 


Rh + 
 eBh0 P h eBh 1  eBh0 P h eBfeuf . (48)
In the solution, euf = Kx, where K is an undetermined matrix. Thus, (48)
can be written as
euh =   Rh +   eBh0 P h eBh 1  eBh0 P hAx 


Rh + 
 eBh0 P h eBh 1  eBh0 P h eBfKx, or
euh = Fx, where (49)
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F =  

Rh + 
 eBh0 P h eBh 1  eBh0 P hA 


Rh + 
 eBh0 P h eBh 1  eBh0 P h eBfK. (50)
8.2 Nash equilibrium
Note that the solution for the problem of the foreign country is exactly sym-
metric. Hence, we obtain euf = Kx, where (51)
K =  

Rf + 
 eBf0 P f eBf 1  eBf0 P fA 


Rf + 
 eBf0 P f eBf 1  eBf0 P f eBhF . (52)
The Nash equilibrium (for given matrices P h and P f) is obtained by
solving the system in (50) and (52). This gives
F =  
0BB@ I   
2

Rh + 
 eBh0 P h eBh 1  eBh0
P h eBf Rf +   eBf0 P f eBf 1  eBf0 P f eBh
1CCA
 1



Rh + 
 eBh0 P h eBh 1  eBh0 P hA+0BB@ I   
2

Rh + 
 eBh0 P h eBh 1  eBh0 P h eBf
Rf + 
 eBf0 P f eBf 1  eBf0 P f eBh
1CCA
 1
 (53)
2

Rh + 
 eBh0 P h eBh 1  eBh0 P h eBf
Rf + 
 eBf0 P f eBf 1  eBf0 P fA
34
and
K =  
0BB@ I   
2

Rf + 
 eBf0 P f eBf 1  eBf0 P f eBh
Rh + 
 eBh0 P h eBh 1  eBh0 P h eBf
1CCA
 1



Rf + 
 eBf0 P f eBf 1  eBf0 P fA+0BB@ I   
2

Rf + 
 eBf0 P f eBf 1  eBf0 P f eBh
Rh + 
 eBh0 P h eBh 1  eBh0 P h eBf
1CCA
 1
 (54)
2

Rf + 
 eBf0 P f eBf 1  eBf0 P f eBh
Rh + 
 eBh0 P h eBh 1  eBh0 P hA
8.3 Verifying the guesses
If the guesses are correct, then the solution must satisfy the Bellman equa-
tions for the two countries. We thus rst substitute (49) and (51) in (47) and
solve for the matrices P h and P f that satisfy the resulting equation. This
gives
P h = Qh + F 0RhF + A0P hA+ A0P h eBhF + A0P h eBfK+
F 0
 eBh0 P hA+ F 0  eBh0 P h eBhF + F 0  eBh0 P h eBfK (55)
+ K 0
 eBf0 P hA+ K 0  eBf0 P h eBhF + K 0  eBf0 P h eBfK.
Working similarly, we obtain for the foreign country
P f = Qf +K 0RfK + A0P fA+ A0P f eBfK + A0P f eBhF+
K 0
 eBf0 P fA+ K 0  eBf0 P f eBfK + K 0  eBf0 P f eBhF (56)
+ F 0
 eBh0 P fA+ F 0  eBh0 P f eBfK + F 0  eBh0 P f eBhF .
9 Appendix B: Sensitivity analysis
Here, we examine the sensitivity of the results in Table 2 to changes in some
key parameters. We will focus on the strength of environmental externali-
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ties, the extent of environmental damage caused by economic activity, how
abundant environmental resources are in nature, and how much the decision
maker values the environment relative to consumption in the utility function.
In each case reported below, all changes in parameters are implemented by
maintaining the remaining parameters at their baseline values in Table 1.
Moreover, in each case, and for the new parameter value, we rst identify
the long-run solution of the model under non-robust policies ( = 106) when
the fear of model misspecication proves to be unfounded. This solution then
provides the initial values for the new dynamic simulation by obtaining poli-
cies for  = 0:02, compared with  = 106. This ensures that the e¤ects can
be comparable to those obtained from the experiments presented in Table 2.
Starting with , which is the parameter measuring the strength of envi-
ronmental externalities, we nd that, as expected, reductions in the extent
of externalities reduce the gains arising from the implementation of precau-
tious policies when the fear of model misspecication is unfounded. This is
because, under lower externalities, the Nash equilibrium is less distorted, so
that there is relatively little benet from precautious policy and the associ-
ated increase in the environmental public good. However, welfare gains from
robust policy do remain even with small externalities (e.g. when  = 0:1).
Similar e¤ects are obtained by reductions in the adverse environmental im-
pact of economic activity, i.e. by reductions in , since this weakens the link
between countries and thus makes the problem of public good under-provision
less acute. However, as above, positive welfare e¤ects of precautious policy,
when the fear of model misspecication is unfounded, do remain even when
the environmental damage caused by the capital stock is very small (e.g.
when  is reduced to 0:005).
Regarding , which measures the valuation of consumption versus envi-
ronmental quality, we nd that increases in  decrease the welfare gains of
precautious policies when the fear of model misspecication is unfounded.
This happens because when the decision maker values consumption more
relative to environment, the distortions under the Nash equilibrium carry a
smaller weight for the decision makers welfare, so that the corrective role
of precaution becomes less important. However, the welfare gains do re-
main even when we increase  as high as 0:9. We then consider the e¤ect of
increases in Qh = Qf , which measures the expected long-run value of envi-
ronmental quality, in the absence of economic activity and of model misspec-
ication. Lower values of this lead to higher welfare gains from precautious
policy when the fear of model misspecication is unfounded, because they
increase the distance of actual environmental quality from its target value,
thus acting to amplify the welfare e¤ect of public good under-provision and
thus amplify the corrective role of robust policy. On the contrary, in a more
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(environmentally) resource abundant world economy, the e¤ects are reversed.
However, the welfare gains from precautious policy when the fear of model
misspecication is unfounded do remain in this setup even for relatively high
values of Qh = Qf approaching Q, e.g. when Qh = Qf = 1:8 (recall that
Q = 2).
Finally, we examine the importance of the targets of consumption and
environmental quality in the utility function. Given the previous analysis,
one would expect that increases in Q relative to c would increase the wel-
fare gains from precautious policy when the fear of model misspecication is
unfounded. This is because this would increase the distance of actual environ-
mental quality from its target value, relative to the distance of private goods
consumption, thus acting to amplify the welfare e¤ect of under-provision of
the public good and thus amplify the corrective role of robust policy. This is
indeed conrmed from the numerical solutions. However, the welfare gains
from precautious policy when the fear of model misspecication is unfounded
do remain even when the ratio of Q=c is reduced to 0:8 from 1:33 which
was its value in the benchmark calibration in Table 1.
We focused on the above parameters for two reasons. First, these parame-
ters are related to the environmental process so that their magnitudes are less
known, at least in comparison to parameters relating to economic quantities,
for which there is relatively more empirical evidence or, at least, consensus.
For instance, depreciation rates and discount factors are commonly used in
calibration of economic models. Second, the parameters related to the envi-
ronmental process have a direct e¤ect on the main incentives that drive our
results, namely (under)provision of environmental quality.
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Figure 1: The effects of robust policy
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